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Factors Underlying Venezuelan Defense 
Expenditures, 1950-83: A Research Note 
Robert E. Looney* 
Introduction 
'A country's military expenditures', the US Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency points out, 'are not necessarily representative of 
military capability.' They do not define a country's efficiency and 
allocation of expenditures or 'whether the quantity and quality of force 
supported by them serves national purposes. '1 
The raw data do enable the measuring of the economic burden, the 
impact on the average person in the country, and the degree to which a 
country values military spending over other forms of government outlay. 
Inevitably, the question that arises from study of the data on military 
expenditures is why the expenditure and particularly why the trend of 
military expenditures. Specifically, is there a threat to the security of the 
particular country; is destabilization by outside forces forcing the 
expansion of military outlay? Otherwise, why is the burden being 
assumed?2 Has the trend of military expenditures simply been affected by 
the easy income of windfall export earnings such as that experienced by 
OPEC countries in the 1970s? 
In a 1973 study of defense expenditures and military rule in Latin 
America, Schmitter3 concluded that the single best explanatory factor for 
the rise or fall of military budgets in individual countries was the 
performance of GNP. That finding has been verified by other studies of 
defense expenditures in Latin America. 
Gertrude Heare4 found in a 1971 study of the six leading military 
spenders in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru 
and Venezuela) that between 1940 and 1970 their outlays fluctuated in the 
aggregate between 2.5 per cent and 3.0 per cent of GNP. Moreover, 
absolute expenditures in constant prices tended to rise over these three 
decades as national economies grew. In brief reviews of the history of 
military spending in each country, Heare could find no uniform pattern 
over time. She did point out that expenditures jumped notably with 
internal conflicts (or with the threat thereof), with periods of economic 
prosperity or with specific attempts to catch up with lags in construction, 
pay scales or equipment replacement. She also noted that military 
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budgets declined in times of economic depression or hardship. 
The general purpose of this paper is to examine in much more detail5 
than Heare or Schmitter the pattern of military expenditures in a country, 
Venezuela, having little apparent need to increase allocations for defense 
over time. The specific purpose of this paper is, given the fact that 
Venezuela did increase its military expenditures over time throughout 
this period, to determine the main factors underlying this expansion. 
Analysis of Trends in Venezuelan Defense Expenditures 
The general observation concerning the stability in Venezuelan military 
expenditure is borne out by the lack of any particular trend in Venezuelan 
defense expenditures. In particular, an econometric analysis of the 
various (Table 1) ratios confirms the overall pattern of stability in 
Venezuela's defense allocations: 
1. Military expenditure as a percent of GDP; 
2. Military expenditure as a percent of government consumption; 
3. Military expenditure as a percent of government expenditure, and 
4. Military expenditure as a percent of government revenue. 
The following dummy variables6 were included in the regression 
equation on a one-by-one basis to test for structural changes associated 
with the post-1973 oil price increases. Since it is not apparent whether the 
1973-74 oil price increases acted immediately or with a lag or whether the 
1978-79 price increases produced a structural shift similar to the 1973-74 
period, several dummy specifications were tested: 
DUMA (0) 1950-73 
(1) 1974-83 
DUMB (0) 1950-72 
(1) 1973-83 
DUMC (0) 1950-73 
(1) 1974-78 
(2) 1979-83 
DUMD (0) 1950-73 
(1) 1974-79 
(2) 1980-83 
In addition, a dummy variable was included in.the regressions to test for 
possible structural shifts associated with different Venezuelan govern-
ments: 
76 
DUMP (0) 1950-57 The Dictatorship 
(1) 1958--68 AD Democratic Action Party 
(2) 1969-73 COPEi Social Christian Party 
(3) 1974-78 AD Democratic Action Party 
(4) 1979-83 COPEi Social Christian Party 
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With regard to changes of regime in Venezuela, the two major political 
parties, the AD and COPEi, are both moderately left of center. 7 The two 
parties began Venezuela's democratic period as partners in a coalition 
government in 1958; by the mid-1980s, their platforms differed, however, 
more in implementation than in substance. 
The AD is the oldest and largest party in Venezuela. Substantively, it 
can be characterized as socialist-populist, similar in general orientation to 
the Iranian or German Social Democratic parties or the British Labour 
Party. It is pragmatic in outlook; it argues in favor of a mixed economic 
system and dedicates itselfto the policy of 'sowing the oil' to diversify the 
economy and develop the nation's infrastructure. It has strong 
commitments to education and agrarian reform, conducts an active 
foreign policy and devotes itself to the concept of a representative 
democracy. The AD enjoys a broad base of support; the peasant 
( campesino) movement and organized labor, however, stand out as 
among the staunchest components of its constituency. 
The COPEi has held a strong second place to the AD since the 
mid-1960s when it copied the AD's organizational structure. The COPEi 
characterizes itself as the 'loyal opposition' to the AD majority and 
commits itself to the translation of Christian social doctrine into political 
principles and programs. Specifically, it espouses such causes as agrarian 
reform, education, social welfare and economic nationalism. Its 
constituency, which shares many elements of the AD, is generally more 
conservative and includes a less significant labor element. If anything, 
therefore, we might expect a structural shift toward proportionately 
(ceteris paribus) greater amounts of public expenditures allocated to 
defense during COPEi administrations. · 
The regression results for the ratio of military expenditures to gross 
domestic product and government consumption were not statistically 
significant for either the time trend or any of the dummy variables; which 
means there is no statistical verification of any secular increase or decrease 
in either the percentage of gross domestic product or government 
consumption allocated to defense expenditures. Furthermore, the oil 
price shocks and change in political regimes were not statistically 
significant in causing structural shifts in the ratio of military expenditure 
to either gross domestic product or government consumption. 
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The regression results for military expenditure as a proportion of 
government revenues and government expenditures also produced 
(Table 1, 2) no statistically significant time trend. However, both ratios 
were strongly affected by the oil price dummys, with the political variable 
also statistically significant and positive for the ratio of military 
expenditures to government revenues. The dummy variables for the oil 
price increases were highly significant for the military expenditures ratio, 
but had consistently lower 't' ratios and 'r-squared' values for the ratio of 
military expenditures to government expenditures. The negative sign on 
the oil dummys indicates that the government may have decided to 
allocate the bulk of the oil windfalls to non-defense activities, while the 
positive sign on the political variable suggests that COPEi administrations 
may be more assiduous than AD administrations in allocating funds for 
the military. 
The effect of the oil price increases is also apparent in an analysis of the 
time trend in real military expenditures. Total real military expenditures 
display a strong time trend in Venezuela with slightly over 75 per cent 
(Table 3) of the fluctuations in military expenditures explained by time 
alone. Several of the measures of structural shift associated with the oil 
price-revenue changes are also statistically significant with the highest 
(Equation 8, Table 3) correlation coefficient-squared (0.938) being 
associated with the trend in oil price increases beginning in 1973. 
Clearly, the results imply a strong time trend and, therefore, stability in 
defense expenditures. The time trend pattern has, however, been broken 
sharply and shifted upward by the sudden affluence associated with the oil 
price increases experienced in the 1970s. Overlapping the structural shifts 
associated with the oil price phenomenon is another set of shifts 
associated with the difference in priorities vis a vis the defense sector 
associated with the two main political parties, with the COPEi more 
inclined to allocate funds for this purpose. 
These patterns are more apparent when an analysis of residuals from 
the regression equation is made. The residuals around the time trend 
regression equations (1st four columns, Table 4) show that military 
expenditures have experienced several cyclical patterns with abnormally 
low allocations occurring in the early 1950s (1952-53), then rather high 
allocations up to 1960, followed by a period of lower than predicted 
defense expenditures all through the 1960s (196{}-1970). The 1970s, in 
turn, were generally a period of abnormally high allocations occurring in 
the defense industry, with only 1970, 1973, 1976 and 1979 expenditures 
falling below the trend line. When dummy variables were added to the 
regression equation to account for the structural shift associated with the 
petroleum boom in the 1970s, a somewhat different picture emerged: 
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1. Not only is the regression equation significantly improved (from an 
r-squared of 0.752 for time to 0.938 for time plus DUMB) but 
several years in the 1960s are no longer seen as times of abnormally 
low expenditures; 
2. In addition, given the correction for the 1973-74 oil price increases, 
several years in the 1970s, despite rapid increases in oil revenues, 
are now below their historical trend (1978and1981 with DUMA); 
3. A regression of real military expenditure on real government 
revenues plus structural shifts associated with petroleum and 
political developments improves the correlation coefficient to 
0.961, indicating that the secular increase in petroleum revenues 
adjusted for structural shifts has played a more important role in 
explaining military expenditures than simply a gradual increase in 
military expenditures associated with an expanding economy; 
4. The analysis of residuals on the regression of military expenditures 
on revenues plus structural changes (Col. 9, Table 4) indicates that, 
contrary to the residuals around the time regression, the later 1960s 
were actually a period of relatively high allocations to military 
activities, while the 1970s, if anything, were a period of relatively 
low allocations (1970, 1971, 1974, 1976, 1977, and 1978 all lying 
below the regression line). 
In general, therefore, the introduction of dummy variables to the trend 
analysis confirms the tentative conclusions obtained earlier that while 
the increase in oil revenues has greatly facilitated the increase in 
the allocations to the defense sector, during the 1970s that sector 
received relatively small allocations in light of the amount of funds 
suddenly placed at the disposal of the government. Again, defense 
expenditures in the country appear to be quite stable, neither reduced in 
line with other government programs during periods of austerity, nor 
increased dramatically during periods of affluence. 
Historical Defense-Macroeconomic Patterns 
The previous section identified government revenue patterns as a major 
element associated with movements in defense expenditures. Clear-
ly, a large percentage of the Venezuelan government's revenues are 
made up of oil revenues. Furthermore, higher oil revenues permit not 
only greater expenditure outlays but, in addition, have exerted 
considerable political pressure on the country's respective ministries to 
increase allocations in all areas. Thus, the.magnitude of oil revenues 
appears to be of critical importance in determining the volume of public 
expenditures in Venezuela. To show the historical relationship of 
I! t 
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government revenues to military expenditures in Venezuela, regressions 
were performed using various macroeconomic variables and fiscal indices 
as regressors. The independent variables included the levels of real 
government expenditure (GEP), real gross domestic product (GDPNP), 
the real government debt (GDP), real government consumption 
(GCNP), the real government current deficit (GDEFP), real government 
revenues (GRP), the financial system's real credit to the government 
(MSGCP), and the public sector's real foreign borrowing (GFSP). In 
addition, the five dummy variables described above were included to test 
for structural shifts in the specified equations. 
To test for stability in the relationships, the 1950-82 time period was 
broken down (arbitrarily) into two sub-periods of more or less equal 
intervals, 1950-65 and 1966-82. The results (Table 5), obtained by 
regressing each variable on defense expenditure, indicate that for the 
period as a whole (1950-82) defense expenditures were (based on the 
correlation coefficient) most closely related to real gross domestic 
product (GDPNP), followed by real government consumption (GCNP), 
real government expenditures (GEP), and real government revenues 
(GRP). Interestingly, government credit from the financial system 
(MSGCP), government foreign borrowing ( GFBP), and real government 
debt had negative signs. In general, a number of dummy variables were 
also significant. The results (Tables 6, 7) for the sub-periods indicate that 
the linkage between defense expenditures and these variables was more 
stable in the 1950-65 period (Table 6), weakening somewhat in the 
1966-82 period (Table 7). The size of the coefficients for all of the 
independent variables is also considerably lower for the 1966-82 period, 
confirming the conclusion reached in the previous section that a 
weakening over time occurred between these major macroeconomic 
aggregates and defense spending. 
Note for the period as a whole (Table 8), the significant increase in the 
elasticity (see below) of defense expenditures (from 0.33 to 0.94) when a 
dummy variable (DUMA) was added to the regression equation to 
capture the structural shift associated with the 1973-74 oil price increase. 
Clearly, the negative sign on the dummy and the rise in elasticity indicate 
that military expenditures have not kept pace directly with the 
post-1973174 increase in oil revenues. 
To gain some idea of the responsiveness of defense expenditures to 
movements in the macro-fiscal variables, regressions were performed on 
the variables in their logarithmic form. In this specification, the co-
efficients of the regression equations are interpreted as elasticities, i.e., 
a 1 per cent change in the independent variabI.e produces an x per cent 
change in real defense expenditures. The results (Tables 8-10) are 
consistent with those presented in the previous analysis (Tables 5-7). In 
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general, the strength of the independent variables in affecting real 
defense expenditures has declined somewhat over time. For example, 
during the 1950--65 period (Table 9) a 1 per cent change in real 
government revenue was associated with a 0.99 per cent change in real 
defense expenditures. By 1966-82, the same 1 per cent change in 
government expenditures was associated with (Table 10) only a 0.48 per 
cent increase in defense spending. The major exception to this pattern is 
government consumption. During the 1950--65 period, real government 
consumption was weakly related (and not statistically significant) to 
defense expenditure - a 1 per cent increase in real consumption 
associated with a 0.55 per cent increase in real defense expenditures. By 
1966-82, not only was real government debt highly significant statistically 
when regressed on defense, but its elasticity had increased to 0.63 (Table 
10). Taking into account the structural shift associated with the post-1973 
increase in petroleum prices, however, it appears that the overall 
(195~2) elasticity of military expenditure with respect to government 
revenues is around 1.00, the same as in the 1950--65 sub-period. 
In short, government revenues have apparently played a dominant role 
in the 195~2 period in influencing defense expenditures, while the link 
between total government expenditures and defense expenditures is not 
nearly as strong in the later (1966-82) period as in the earlier (1950--65) 
period. The level of real government consumption also appears much 
more influential in explaining defense expenditures in the later period, 
with a correlation coefficient of 0.740 compared to 0.222 in the 1950--65 
period (Tables 9, 10). The links between both real gross domestic product 
and defense appear to have declined over time (judged by the elasticity), 
although when corrected for the post-1973 oil price increases, the 
elasticity of 0.97 (1950-82) is slightly lower than the 1.23 for the 1950--65 
period. 
Impact of Military Expenditures in Other Latin American Countries 
One possible factor affecting Venezuelan military expenditures could 
be the perceived need on the part of the Venezuelan authorities to 
emulate military expenditures in neighboring states. This need could 
reflect either an imagined threat to Venezuelan security or simply 
emulation of the acquisitions of new weapons systems by regional 
neighbors. 
To test the importance of this emulation effect, real military 
expenditures were regressed on real military expenditures in several 
neighboring countries. The results (Table 11) indicate that except for 
Ecuador, no statistically significant relationships were found. The lagged 
values of military expenditures in the sample of neighboring countries 
e ! 
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were also regressed on Venezuelan real military expenditures and again, 
except for Ecuador, no statistically significant relationships existed. 
It should be noted that the relationship with Ecuadoran military 
expenditures is barely significant (2.39 t value, Table 11) and, perhaps 
more importantly, the relationship is probably spurious: Ecuador 
is also an OPEC oil producer and most likely expanded its military 
expenditures after the 1973 oil price increases in a manner similar to Vene-
zuela. 
The correlation pattern of Venezuelan and Ecuadoran military 
expenditures can also be corrected for in part by the strong time trend in 
the regression of real military expenditure over time. For the 1955-83 
period, time alone accounts for 66.4 per cent of the fluctuations in 
Venezuelan military expenditure (Table 12) and 56.1 per cent of the 
fluctuations in Ecuadoran military expenditures. 
Introducing the effect of the 1973-74 oil price increases in the 
regression equations (Equations 2 and 9, Table 12) increases the 
r-squared correlation coefficient to 88 per cent for Venezuela and 90.7 
per cent for Ecuador. The oil price structural change was positive for both 
countries (each of which is a member of OPEC) and highly significant, 
indicating a break in the historical pattern of military expenditures for 
each country, wherein additional revenues accrued to both governments 
after 1973. 
Note, also, the strong time trends in military expenditures for 
Colombia, Peru and Mexico. Of the major oil importers examined, 
Colombia and Brazil experienced reductions in military expenditures 
following the 1973-74 oil price increases, while Peru's pattern of real 
military expenditures was not affected by these external shocks (Table 
12). Mexico and Argentina, both domestic producers of oil, did not 
experience alterations in their pattern of military expenditures following 
the oil price shocks. Of course, Argentina's pattern of military 
expenditure was greatly affected by the Falklands War. A dummy 
variable (DUMW) for this period (Values: 0=1955-81, 1=1982-83) was 
highly significant when regressed (Table 12) on that country's real 
military expenditures. 
In short, one can conclude that Venezuelan military expenditures have 
been determined largely by developments internal to that country (oil 
revenues and increased gross domestic product), with military expendi-
ture patterns of regional countries affecting allocations for Venezuelan 
defense marginally, if at all. 
Determinants of the Deviation from Trends in Rt!al Military Expenditures 
As noted above, once correcting for the structural change associated 
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with the post-1973 oil price increases, one finds great stability in the 
patterns of Venezuelan military expenditures. The linkage between 
government revenues and military expenditures is undoubtedly more 
complicated than outlined above, however. It is unlikely that there is a 
pure one-to-one relationship between government revenue and military 
expenditures in each time period. To throw more light on the matter, this 
subsection examines in detail the linkages over time between changes in 
government (largely oil) revenues and the subsequent allocations for 
military expenditures. 
Because of the strength of the time trend in both military expenditure 
and its major determinants - government revenues (GRP), government 
expenditures ( GEP), gross domestic product ( GDPNP), and government 
consumption (GCNP) - the empirical relationships may be somewhat 
spurious. Military expenditures and government expenditures might, for 
example, be correlated with some other variable which, in turn, had a 
strong time trend. The high correlation between military expenditure 
and, for example, gross national product would have been only apparent 
and not indicative of any particular casual relationship. 
To determine whether or not spurious correlation accounted for the 
high correlations of military expenditure and the independent variables 
examined above, all variables were regressed on time and the dummy 
variables associated with oil prices and political change. The deviations 
from the trend for each of the variables were then regressed on the 
deviations from the trend in real military expenditure (MEPDT), i.e., the 
deviations from the regression equation of real military expenditures 
regressed on time. 
The various measures of deviations from the trend in real government 
revenues were computed from the deviations from the regression 
equation or real government revenues on: 
1. Time (GRPDT), 
2. Time, DUMC, DUMP (GRPDCP), 
3. Time, DUMC (GRPDTC); 
4. Time, DUMP (GRPDTP), 
5. Time, DUMD (GRPDTD). 
The deviations from the trend in government revenues lagged one year 
were: 
1. Time, DUMC (GRPDTCL); 
2. Time (GRPDTL). 
Similarly, deviations from the trend • were computed for the 
macro-variables assumed to affect real military expenditures. These 
deviations were computed from: 
. ~ 
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1. For government expenditure, the regression of real government 
expenditure on time (GEPDT); 
2. For gross national product, the regression of real gross national 
product on: 
(a) Time (GDPNPDT); 
(b) Time, DUMP (GDPNPDT); 
3. For government consumption, the regression of real government 
consumption on time ( GCNPDT); 
4. For gross national product lagged one year, the regression of gross 
national product lagged one year on: 
(a) Time (GDNPNDTL); 
(b) Time, DUMA (GDPNPDTAL); 
(c) Time, DUMP (GDPNPDTPL). 
The results (Table 13) show that even after extracting the trend from 
military expenditure and the major independent variables selected for the 
analysis, the strong statistical significance of the regression equations 
persists. In terms of government revenues, a number of alternative 
specifications of the deviation from the trend were statistically significant 
when regressed on military expenditures with the deviations from the 
trend of government revenues regressed on time and DUMD 
(GRPDTD), accounting for over 40 per cent (Table 14) ofthe deviations 
from the trend in military expenditures regressed on time (MEPDT). 
Interestingly, lagged values of the deviations from the trend 
(GRPDTCL, GRPDTL) in government revenues (Table 13) were also 
statistically significant in accounting for deviations from the trend in real 
military expenditures. 
Lagged deviations from the trend for real gross national product (Table 
13) were also highly significant in explaining deviations from the trend in 
real military expenditures. In fact, lagged values for real gross national 
product were much more highly correlated with deviations from the trend 
in real military expenditure than current period values for GDP. 
Conclusions 
The statistically significant results obtained using lagged values, together 
with the stability of real defense expenditures as a share in gross domestic 
product, suggest that long-run forces may interact to maintain stability in 
the level of defense allocations. Revenue or expenditure changes clearly 
affect defense expenditures over more than a one year time interval. 
In brief, our analysis of the data for the 1970i and early 1980s indicates 
that the trends perceived by Heare and Schmitter have persisted but are 
not as strong as those found in the 1950s and 1960s. Presumably, the 
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Venezuelan government wishes to maintain some overall proportion of 
GNP in defense expenditures, thus delineating the optimal level of 
defense expenditures. The difference between the actual level of defense 
expenditures at any point in time and this optimal level affects the amount 
of funds allocated for defense in any single year. Apparently, because of 
uncertainty concerning the optimal level of defense expenditures caused 
by oil shocks in the 1970s and early 1980s, the government has had an 
increasingly difficult time in delineating the speed with which actual levels 
of defense expenditures are to be adjusted to the optimal level. 
Given the country's limited need for defense expenditures, it will be 
interesting to observe how the government scales down the optimal level 
of defense expenditures in response to declining oil revenues and how 
significant an impact this declining optimal level will have on year-to-year 
cutbacks in defense expenditures. 
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NOTES: Estimations made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration process for serial correlation; see text for definition of symbols 
c~ ';. \Wa~i~'4\~ -
• r iii a~son statistic 
• aria e agged one year 00 
...;i 
TABLE 4 00 00 
VENEZUELAN REAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURE: TREND ANALYSIS, RESIDUALS (ACTUAL - ESTIMATED) 
TREilD VlliH:&:BC£ 
TIME GRP 
TIME TIME TIME DUMB GEP DUMD GCNP 
TIME DUMA DUMB DUMP Da-.P GEP DUMC GRP DUMP GDP NP GCNP DUMA 
1951 43.2 -73.0 -59. 7 34.B -24.1 -170.0 -157.0 -133.0 -230.0 -194.0 -212.0 -200.0 
1952 -12.5 -120.0 -118.0 -39.6 -97.3 -175.0 -165.0 -146.0 -221.0 -205.0 -215. o -210.0 
1953 -71.2 -173.0 -192.0 -120.0 -183.0 -195.0 -185.0 -166.0 -237.0 -241. 0 -246.0 -233.0 
1954 40.4 -59.6 -104.0 -32.4 -104.0 -42.1 -28.9 -2.2 -85.8 -122.0 -118.0 -87. 7 
1955 88.6 15.1 -7 .2 10.0 -34.4 -11.9 7.2 25.1 75.5 -40.8 -26.2 -16.6 
1956 42.1 -1.0 6.5 -39.4 -50.3 -57.9 -38.6 -91.0 -27. 7 -82. 7 -11.8 -37.0 
1957 277.0 25.2 265.0 183.0 187.0 118.0 155.0 160.0 223.0 94.4 184.0 180.0 
1958 246.0 27 .5 365.0 509.0 467.0 -15.2 36.6 156.0 197 .o 247.0 20.3 46.8 
1959 17.4 80.6 207.0 127.0 228.0 -103.0 -83.6 -165.0 74.5 93.6 123.0 6.9 
1960 -218.0 -163.0 -80.2 -140.0 62. 7 -231.0 -222. o -278.0 -80.0 -73.0 -255.0 -288.0 
1961 -121 .o -103.0 -112.0 -97.0 -80. -115.0 -86.8 -.130.0 -185.0 -47.2 -60.8 -70.1 
1962 -242.0 -213.0 -244.0 -234.0 -223.0 -95.0 -87.3 -169.0 -265.0 -111 .o -104.0 -125.0 
1963 -13. 3 9.0 -64.3 -35.9 -47.4 89.3 122. o 107.0 -95.1 50.8 34.0 84. 3 
1964 -146.0 -84.6 -111.0 -165.0 -130.0 -37.9 -10.0 -54. 7 -64.9 -62.6 22.8 9.9 
1965 -32.6 39.1 3.2 -69.4 -31.1 86.8 120.0 104.0 131.0 91. 7 97.5 115.0 
1966 -127 .o -24.2 -28. 7 -166.0 -93.9 -3.6 28.9 24.4 175.0 63.5 17.6 25.0 
1967 31.3 146.0 134.0 -24.9 52.9 149.0 190.0 142.0 337.0 220.0 201.0 216.0 
1968 -16.0 -6.9 27.4 -213.0 -89.0 -34.8 2.0 -61.1 335.0 41.0 82.9 51.6 
1969 -323.0 -169.0 -163.0 -58.8 -61.5 -149.0 -112.0 -153.0 -124.0 -37.6 -63.0 -77.5 
1970 -304.0 -166.0 -221.0 -230.0 -166.0 -36. 7 -2.4 -101 .o -292.0 -136.0 -154.0 -72.3 
1971 63.8 204.0 125.0 114.0 170.0 331.0 376.0 279.0 -77.4 240.0 233.0 345.0 
1972 93.4 299.0 318.0 167 .o 308.0 258.0 313.0 268.0 229.0 342.0 279.0 345.0 
1973 -29.6 226.0 -426.0 54.0 -231. o 110.0 164.0 -27 .3 52.2 65.0 118.0 179.0 
1974 807.0 274.0 515.0 537.0 488.0 550.0 291.0 61.5 -541.0 16S."1' 652.0 64.4 
1975 726.0 667.0 833. 7 691.0 145.0 527.0 544.0 689.0 398.0 193.0 554.0 464.0 
1976 -732.0 -714.0 -427.0 -735.0 -578.0 -1060.0 -1030.0 -910.0 -219.0 -803.0 -1090.0 -1130.0 
1977 314.0 163.0 87. 7 160.0 48.6 106.0 185.0 439.0 186.0 22.2 22.2 211.0 
1978 41.5 -37.7 -1.9 -85.1 -100.0 0.1 25.6 127.0 465.0 -98.1 -5.31 36.1 

























TABLE 4 (Can't) 
VENEZUELAN REAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURE: TREND ANALYSIS, RESIDUALS (ACTUAL - ESTIMATED) 
mRD vi'irnm 
TIME GRP 
TIME TIME DUMB GEP DUMD 
DUMB DUMP DOMP GEP DUMC GRP DUMP GDPNP 
-219.0 -214.0 -210.0 69.0 -26.4 182.0 117.0 37. I 
-308.0 -251. D -293.0 
- - - -
229.0 
0.938 0.853 0.927 0.360 0.443 D.322 0.961 0.858 
229. 7 87.36 114. 79 16.87 11.15 14. 24 221.R6 188. 50 
I. 91 1.89 1.89 2.11 2.32 2.80 2.00 2.13 
NOTES: Estimations made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration process for serial correlation; see text for definition of symbols. 
( ) • t statistic 
F = F statistic 
OW = Durbin-Watson statistic 







GCNP DUMA > 
56. 7 20.7 z 0 219.0 132.0 tl1 
o. 729 0.566 ti! 
83.48 19.54 z 















TABLE 5 ?g 
Determinants of Venezuelan Military Expenditures, 1950-82 
Equation 
~eriilent vaMables- ----- ------ ------- -- --,i-arrstics 
Gi!P GEP GOPNP Gt P DUMA o\J18 olllc olllo OlJIP RHO rZ F DA 
(I) MEP = 0.018 0.91 
(3.77) (12. 78) 0.321 14.24 2.80 
(2) 0.035 0.81 
(4.10) (7.95) 0.360 16.87 2.11 
(3) 0.015 0.44 
(13. 28) (2. 79) 0.854 176.49 2.17 
(4) 0.096 0.585 
(8.71) (4.08) 0.716 75.84 1.98 
(5) 0.037 389.83 0.17 
( 14.64) (4.41) (0.98) 0.928 181. 72 2.07 
(6) 0.027 408.82 0.81 
(3.04) (2.97) (7.96) 0.443 ll.15 2. 32 
(7) 0.021 455.56 0.84 
(2.01) (2.05) (8.96) 0.390 8.96 2. 27 
(8) • 0.018 -364.58 0.25 
(10.19) (-2.05) (1.47) 0.921 163.00 1.96 
(9) 0.056 767. 56 0.73 
(2.62) (2.22) (6.ll) 0.576 19.05 2.34 
(10) 0.059 428.01 o. 75 
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TABLE 5 (con't) 
Determinants of Venezuelan Military Expenditures, 1950-82 
Equation 
Independent Variables ----statTsfics 
MSGCP GF!W GbP DUKA tllMll tlUMc OiMll !l\MP RHO r2 F tM 































(16. 79) o. 325 
-317.50 0.96 
(-1:86) (21.35) 0.185 
390.17 0.92 
(1.87) (13.53) 0.348 
0.93 
(14.43) 0.403 
713. 59 0.92 
(3.98) (13. 72) 0.437 
-404.88 0.961 
(-2. 79) (19.92) o. 328 
NOTES: Estimations made using Cochrane-Orcutt two state process for serial correlation correction; see text for definition of symbols: 
( ) = t statistic 
F = F statistic 
OW = Durbin-Watson statistic 
11.49 2.49 
5.03 2.19 
6. 76 2. 73 
3.17 2.38 
7.48 2.61 
9.44 2. 71 
10.87 2.08 




























DETERMINANTS OF VENEZUELAN MILITARY EXPENOITURES, 1950-1965 
Equation 
Independent Variables -->UffiTics 
GRP GEP GOP NP GCNP GDP M5GCP DlJIP RHO r2 F Oil 
(1) HEP • 0.084 0.43 
(5.40) (1.85) 0.691 29.16 1. 74 
(2) 0.084 0.75 




(3.72) 0.617 21.01 1.61 
(4) 0.096 0.83 
(2.50) (5.80) 0.325 6.28 1.80 
(5) 0.056 0.92 
(-2. 31) (9. 77) 0.293 5.36 2.23 
(6) 
-0.11 758.82 0.21 
(-5.40) (9.56) (0.81) 0.891 49.50 1.89 
(7) 0.061 338. 71 0.63 
(3.38) (3.04) (3.20) 0.688 13.23 1.53 
(8). 0.10 -257.54 0.85 
(7.47) (-2.87) (6.46) 0.840 31.60 1.87 
(9) 0.019 211.35 0.76 
(3.89) (1.91) (4.47) 0.636 10.52 1. 73 
NOTES: Estimations made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration procedure for serial correlation: 
( I = t statistic 
F • F statistic; 
r2 •correlation coefficient; 
OW • Durbin Watson statistic; 
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TABLE 7 
DETERMINANTS OF VENEZUELA MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1966-1982 
Equation 
rnaepen-dentVaria~· Stat1st1cs 
GRP GEP GDP NP GCNP DltlB RHO rZ F ow 








(5) 0.025 413.41 
(4.20) (1.49) 
(6) 0.014 lOIA.26 
(1.80) (3.41) 
(7) 0.007 692.04 
(2.41) (1.95) 
(8) 0.031 985.13 
.. (1.82) (3.14) 
NOTES: Estimations made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration procedure for serial 
( ) • t statistic 
F • F statistic; 
r2 = correlation coefficient; 
OW •Durbin Watson statistic; 
L = variable lagged one year. 
-0.36 
(-1.57) 0.948 258.03 2.ll 
0.44 
(2.00) 0.521 15.26 1.88 
0.13 
(0.57) 0,804 57 .54 1.98 
0.32 
(1.37) 0.632 24.02 1.88. 
-0.36 
(-1.61) 0.955 130.12 2.27 
-0.17 
(-0.69) 0.887 47 .51 2.19 
-0.17 
(-0. 72) 0.905 56.97 2.14 
-0.21 





















TABLE 7 (cont'd) 
DETERMINANTS OF VENEZUELAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1966-1982 
Eguation 
Tnde,)en<fnet Vai'labTes - - StIBIBcs 
RsGtP GFRP GOP GDEF P oll4c olJ4o Dli4P RHO r l F OW 








(4) -0.022 627.56 
(-2.85) (4.73) 
(SJ 0.032 -561.55 
(1.89) (-2.41) 





NOTES: Estimations made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration procedure for serial correlation: 
( ) = t statistic 
F = F statistic; 
r2 •correlation coefficient; 
OW = Durbin watson statistic; 
L = variable lagged one year. 
,, t• 
0.83 
(6.08) 0.287 5.63 2.50 
0.85 
(6.51) 0.154 2. 55 2.28 
0.91 
.(9.27) 0.300 2. 57 2. 73 
0.18 
(0. 75) 9.785 21.97 2.10 
0.87 
(7 .35) 0.356 3.32 3.09 
0.72 
(4.18) 0.502 6.06 2.08 
0.87 













VENEZUELAN MILITARY EXPENDITURE ELASTICITIES, 1950-1982 
Equation GllP GEP 
lndGljendent Variables 


















(8) 0.97 -0.11 
(7.81) (-0.83) 





NOTES: Estimations made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration procedure for serial correlation: 
( ) = t statistic 
F = F statistic; 
r2 •correlation coefficient; 
0~ : ~m~1~a;~iie~t~~~s~~~k 
. . 






RHO ri F Dll trl 
0.89 ): 
(11.08) 0.295 12.56 2. 24 z 
0 
0.78 trl 
(7 .10) 0.643 54.24 1.95 til 
0.69 z tn (5.46) 0.736 83.84 2.11 trl 
trl 
o. 76 >< (6.69) 0.556 37.59 2.06 t8 
0.92 z 
(14.16) 0.208 7.88 2.23 0 
-
0.17 ~ 
(l.44) 0.944 236. 24 1.92 ~ 
0.80 ¥ 
(7.48) 0.615 22.44 1.97 ... \0 
VI 
2.62 ? (4.49) 0.818 63.15 2.04 ~ <.;J 
0.83 
(8.63) 0.404 9.51 2.06 
0.91 















VENEZUELAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES ELASTICITIES, 1950-1965 
lnde~endent Variables ·stalfst-ics 




















(-2.88) (O. 53) 
Esti1111tions made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration procedure for serial correlation: 
( ) • t statistic 
F • F statistic; 
r2 •correlation coefficient; 
OW • Durbin Watson statistic; 
L • variable lagged one year. 
0.28 
(1.13) 0.835 65.94 1. 7! 
0.756 
(4.46) o. 731 35.43 l.6:l 
0.70 
. (3.91) 0.626 21. 77 1.60 
0.85 
(6.34) 0.222 3. 73 1.68 
0.89 
(7.71) 0.417 9.30 2.12 
0.65 
(3.35) 0.630 10.24 1. 73 
0.48 
(2.15) 0.928 77.42 1. 78 
o. 76 
(4.61) 0.604 9.15 1.67 
0.86 
(6.57) 0.230 1. 79 1.65 
0.887 
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TABLE 10 
VENEZUELAN MILITARY EXPENDITURE ELASTICITIES, 1966-1982 
Stat1sl1cs 












(2.70) (1. 75) 




Estimations made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration procedure for serial correlation: 
( ) = t statistic 
F • F statistic; 
r2 = correlation coefficient; 
OW = Durbin Watson statistic; 
L = variable lagged one year. 
-0.27 
(-1.15) 0.962 359.9 2.13 
0.42 
(l.86) 0.676 29.27 1.82 
0.12 
(0.52) 0.861 86.97 1.92 
0.30 
(l.30) 0.740 139. 92 1.81 
0.87 
(7.08) 0.027 0.40 2.17 
0.08 
(0.34) 0.859 36.83 1.94 
-0.11 
(-0.42) 0.903 56.12 2.09 
-0.17 
































VENEZUELAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURE RESPONSE TO DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN 
SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1955-1982 
Venefo-el an 
Peru Mexico Colombia Ecuador Brazil Defense Ecuador 
Defense Defense Defense Defense Defense Expenditure Defense 
Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Lagged Expenditure 
















NOTES: Estimations made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration procedure for serial correlation: 
( ) = t statistic 
~ = F statistic; 
r =correlation coefficient; 
OW = Durbin Watson statistic; 
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TABLE 12 ~ 
Determinants of Military Expenditures, Selected Latin American Countries, 1955-1983, z 
Trend Analysis tr1 
N 
c:: 
Trend Variables Stat1st1cs tr1 
Eguation TIME o!JIX o!JIB jj!JI~ O~!i RHO r! r ow 5: 
Venezuela z 
~ HEP • 120.01 0.52 ti {6.R9) (3.19) 0.664 47.58 1.81 tr1 ~ (2) 71.97 913.82 0.30 z (4.45) (3.86) (1.60) 0.880 81.11 1.93 VJ 
tr1 
(3) 70.27 963.51 -0.09 ~ (5.56) (4.91) (-0.51) 0.939 172.22 2.01 ~ (4) 87.96 357 .07 0.50 z (3.48) (1.64) (2.91) 0.723 28. 72 1.89 0 
(5) 80.81 454.25 0.53 § (3.21) (2.06) (3.18) o. 712 27.21 1.89 ~ Columbia VJ ~ 384.87 0.66 -(1. 74) (4.59) 0.110 3.05 1. 70 ..... IC 
VI 
(7) 972. 38 -11623.0 -0.13 ~ (9.46) (-7.26) (-0.67) o. 799 43. 79 2.10 ..., 
Ecuador 
-m- 190.56 0.52 (5.54) (3.18) 0.561 30. 79 2.24 
(9) 92.93- 1873.34 -0.07 
(3.87) (4.92) (-0.37) 0.907 107 .45 1. 93 
(10) 113. 71 1395.62 0.19 
(3.25) (2.65) (0.96) 0.816 48.89 2.00 
~ 
TABLE 12 (con't) ...... 
Oetermi nants of Mi 1 itary Expenditures, Selected Lat in American Countries, 1955-83 8 
Trend Analysis 
Trend Variables Statistics 
Eguation TIME DUMA DlJolB DI.IMC DlJolD DlJolW RHO r2 .F ow 
Peru \IT) 13491.6 0.64 
(5. 71) (4.26) 0.576 32.62 1.82 
(12) 11173.6 31200. 3 0.54 




(4.63) 0.077 1.84 2.23 
(14) 3942.5 -17816.5 0.45 
(3.22) (1.85) (2.53) 0.363 5.71 2.1~ 
(15) 3904.0 -18792.4 0.50 
(3.15) (-1.89) (2.83) 0.339 5.14 2.1~ 
Mexico 
"""TI'6T" 685.93 0.37 (13.07) (2.06) 0.876 171.06 1.63 
. (17) 865. 71 -2479.6 0.62 
(7.64) (-1.86) (4.10) o. 770 36.86 1.84 
(18) 665.04 390.89 0.38 
(7.45) (0.31) (2.11) 0.874 76. 73 1.63 
~ 9 575.66 8050.54 0.88 > (2.77) (8.39) (10.02) 0.815 53.04 1.32 :;i::i 
(20) 8358.8 0.97 ~ (ll (8.55) (22.30) o. 745 73.14 1.24 (j 
NOTES: ESt1A10tions 11111de using cochrane-Orcutt two state process for serial correlation correction; see text for definition of symbols: 0 
( ) • t statistic ~ F • F statistic 














VENEZUELA: GOVERNMENT REVENUE DETERMINANTS OF THE DEVIATIONS FRCJ4 THE HISTORICAL 
TREND IN DEFENSE EXPENDITURE, 1950-1982 
Measures of the oevTatTOrlOfRevi,-nues from th-e H1stor1caT 
Trend in Government Revenues 































NOTES: Estimations made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration process for serial correlation; see text for definition of symbols 
( ) = t statistic 
F • F statistic 
OW = Durbin-Watson statistic 
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